氣候正義：一個雙軌的談判

文/趙中麒

兩個半月的閱讀與研究，本月8日，終於完成在此的第一份不定期報告。報告是關於台灣市民社會的發展。原想節錄此報告，但關於台灣市民社會的中文研究，在台灣相當容易找到，而「散落」在外的工作夥伴們應該也都對此議題有一定熟悉度，故決定不予節錄。倒是，中國專案負責人將於本月底至下月中旬，於中國北京、昆明等地舉辦氣候正義工作坊。為了此次工作坊，她請我協助翻譯兩篇關於哥本哈根氣候會談與氣候正義的短文，以做為此次工作坊的教材。由於「氣候正義」是一個新穎的名詞，多數台灣人可能對此陌生。因此，我將其中一份翻譯附上，做為本次月報告。翻譯下方，是原文。如果閱讀者發現譯處難以理解，或自認英文比中文好，可對照或直接閱讀原文。原文是公開文件，並經過Focus on the Global South同意上呈為月報告內容。

聯合國哥本哈根氣候變遷會議之分析：
寫給關注美國政府角色之政策分析家的簡報

2010年1月21日

2009年12月，在〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉下，193個國家的代表聚集在哥本哈根，「以達成一個全面的、遠大的且有效的國際氣候變遷協定。」可是，會議結束後所公佈的哥本哈根協定，卻遠遠不合我們對這個目標的期待。

作為造成氣候危機的國家，美國與其他富國有責任領導一個有效的與正義的處理氣候變遷的方式。儘管在多年的努力後，哥本哈根會議才得以順利舉行，然而，正是因為已開發國家不願意誠懇面對此議題，甚至忽略他們替自己所設下的時間限制，而使達成一個遠大的、有效的會議結果，變得不太可能。不幸的是，美國的言行，並不讓人驚訝。隨著〈哥本哈根氣候協定〉的出台，美國與其他富國並未承諾減少溫室氣體排放與提供足夠的資金解決發展中國家可能面臨的氣候變遷問題。此外，此協定的談判過程，不民主、不透明，並將聯合國的官方程序置之一邊。歐巴馬政府與作為〈聯合國氣候變化框架公約〉暨《京都議定書》締約國會議主席的丹麥，在侵蝕環境的完善性、公平性與正義的同時，嚴重破壞了聯合國氣候變化綱要公約會議的過程。

國際氣候談判：一個雙軌路線的過程

1992年所通過的〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉，是一個指導政府如何處理氣候變遷的框架協定。《京都議定書》就是按照此公約所訂，結合所有國家所同意的行動，以執行已開發國家的碳排放減量承諾。雖然美國並未批准《京都議定書》，但該議定書是框架公約的一部分，因此，遵守議定書，就是遵守框架公約。氣候變遷框架公約的談判，是在一個雙軌路線下進行的：在京都議定書下，執行附錄一國家承諾之特別工作組（Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, AWG-KP），以及執行長期合作行動特別工作組（Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, AWG-LCA），後者是依照框架公約之規定進行的談判路線。這兩條路線，被設計在哥本哈根氣候會談中訂定兩項結果，一個是法律的結果，另一則是實質的結果。

《京都議定書》明定附錄一（已開發）國家所需減少的碳排放量，以及透過什麼機制來減少碳排放。議定書的第一階段承諾期，將於2012年結束。在過去四年中，透過附錄一國家特別工作組（AWGKP），國際社會一直針對附錄一國家的第二階段承諾期進行協商。儘管如此，富國已經證明，他們不願意在這個協商路線下對減排進行任何承諾，富國的行徑，讓整個協商過程，充滿了難以言喻的沮喪。

2007年，國際社會接受了巴厘行動計畫（Bali Action Plan），此計畫帶來了與AWGKP平行的第二條協商路線，即執行長期合作行動特別工作組（AWG-LCA），以在2012年之後，仍能強化對氣候變化框架公約的執行。AWG-LCA所考慮的議題在於，如何提供經費予發展中國家的氣候危機解決方案，例如科技合作、森林保護、氣候變遷影響之適應及以特定國家為範圍的行動等，發展中國家可以透過這些行動來減少碳排放。重要的是，在一個讓美國與全球氣候變遷行動共同合作的努力中，巴厘行動計畫中的某項行動，被設計來確保美國會在AWG-LCA路線下進行減碳，而美國的減碳量足以和其他按照京都議定書行動的國家之減排量相比擬。

在為期兩星期的哥本哈根會談中的大多數時間內，各國的談判代表，在這兩個路線下，為了消除彼此對協商文件認知上的歧異，因為該文件代表哥本哈根氣候會議的結論，耗費許多時間在用字遣辭上，以讓與會者達成共識，也因此經常讓談判持續至深夜。然而，協商過程經常因為丹麥不熟悉會議程序而受到阻礙。直到12月8日星期五的深夜，也就是19號星期六的凌晨，哥本哈根協議才出爐，而星期五應該是該次會議的最後一天。

此協議與多年來一直在進行的雙軌談判路線背道而馳，而雙軌路線一直是〈聯合國氣候變化框架公約〉的討論重點。丹麥在主持會議期間，對於富國中的某一群國家，有求必應，但卻忽略其他國家，特別是許多發展中國家所關心的事物，而無視自身做為會議主席所肩負的責任，即保證各國所參與的會議，是一個以雙軌路線為基礎的公平與透明的談判。在整個協商過程中，丹麥的行為，危及了原本就已經相當脆弱的信任關係，而此信任關係是一個公平與有效的談判之基礎。

在這個讓人感到疑惑的會議結果中，這兩條談判路線到底成就了什麼，很少被注意：AWG-LCA所需進行的工作，可以在哥本哈根會談中結束，卻被延長至2010年墨西哥的會談。AWG-KP的工作，也同樣延長到2010年。因此，在這兩條路線下的協商，將會繼續，而關於日後的工作與哥本哈根協定之間錯綜複雜的關係之疑問，也仍會被繼續爭論。

需要從哥本哈根得到什麼

一個哥本哈根會議的成功結果，將要求已開發國家承諾兩件事：大規模減少溫室氣體排放，與提供足夠的經費以處理開發中國家的氣候變遷議題。哥本哈根協定，卻一件也沒做到。

發展中國家對造成氣候危機的責任最少，但氣候變遷危機的影響，卻傷害他們最深。〈聯合國氣候變遷綱要公約〉的信條之一，就是共同但有區分的責任（common but differentiated responsibilities）。這項原則，承認已開發國家在造成氣候危機上的歷史責任，以及發展中國家追求永續發展的權利。在這項公約之下，做為歷史上最大污染者的美國與其他已開發國家，在兩件事情上，負有法律上的責任：其一，大規模減少其過內的溫室氣體排放，其二，在經費上協助發展中國家轉型為使用潔淨能源的經濟體並處理氣候變遷對其所造成的影響。

愈來愈多的科學家警告，大氣中的二氧化碳濃度，必須降至相對安全的350ppm以下，以避免可能發生的毀滅性結果。為了達成這個目標，我們需要大規模且快速地減少溫室氣體排放。然而，根據一份文件，在談判桌上被討論的二氧化碳減排計畫，卻允許大氣中的二氧化碳濃度提升至550ppm，而這將會造成全球溫度上升攝氏3度；這份文件是在為期兩週的會議結束後流出會場。根據氣候變遷跨政府小組（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）的研究顯示，非洲的氣溫將高於全球平均溫度1.5倍；此小組是由世界頂尖的科學家、經濟學家與其他專家共同組成，以處理氣候變遷。在哥本哈根會議中，非洲的領導人清楚表示，全球氣溫如果上升攝氏2度，將會對非洲大陸的人民造成毀滅性影響。

處理發展中國家因氣候變遷導致的影響，所需的花費差距相當大，不過，聯合國經濟社會事務部（UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs）在其2009年的世界經濟社會調查報告（2009 World Economic and Social Survey）中指出，發展中國家需要1%的世界生產毛額，約5000億到6000億美金，以處理氣候變遷的影響；此部分的經費，大多數來自公部門，例如，馬歇爾計畫之類的發展方案（Marshall Plan）。

哥本哈根協定的內容

在這份兩頁半的〈哥本哈根氣候變遷協定〉中，最值得注意的，是該協定所沒有做到的事情。關於2012年之後已開發國家的整體減排目標，該協定並不明定（當目前京都議定書的承諾期間結束後）。個別國家可能會有個別的減排目標，但沒有任何條款可以約束這些保證。已開發國家在2012年後的減排承諾之缺乏，是這次氣候峰會最大的失敗。

這份協定確認全球溫度上升，需低於攝氏2度，但是，卻沒有任何系統能決定個別國家的承諾是否達成此項目標。一些分析已經指出，目前已開發國家的承諾，並不足以實現上述目標。例如，上面所提到的那份從哥本哈根會議流出的文件估計，由於減排承諾遠不及預期，全球溫度極有可能上升至少3度。

哥本哈根協定的確給了美國一些它所需要的用語，這些用語和主要發展中國家的政策透明度以及行動核實有關，例如：緩和溫室氣體排放。由於國內的政治原因，對於確保中國會落實其減排承諾這件事情上，美國特別有興趣。這份協定中規定最仔細的一段，是關於發展中國家緩和溫室氣體排放行動的措施、報告，以及對這些行動的核定等。這些規定，對於低度發展國家與小型島國而言，不具強制力，但對其他發展中國家，則是一項具有強制力的規定。

哥本哈根協定包括了兩個空白附錄，這兩個目錄原本應該在1月31日以前，由其他跟此協定有關的國家共同填入，雖然現在看來，此最後時限似乎無法完成了。第一份附錄，應該讓《京都議定書》之附錄一國家明確訂出其2020年以前依照經濟規模所設定的減排目標。這份目錄有一個表格，以讓各國登記他們實現減排目標的基準年，如果沒有達成此目標，則該國會被評量為何沒有達成目標。所有《京都議定書》的承諾所依據的標準，都是和1990年進行比較後所定，但美國與其他國家卻一直使用2005年的減排標準。協定中的第二個附錄，與《京都議定書》非目錄一國家（即發展中國家）有關，此目錄之目的，在於讓發展中國家紀錄其依照各國狀況所設定的最妥適的減排行動。

在財政方面，哥本哈根協定替已開發國家設定一項目標，讓他們在2020年以前，每年投入1000億美金於減緩氣候變遷的研究。這項不具約束力的目標，無法保證已開發國家是否真的會投入這筆經費，畢竟，在實踐經費承諾這件事情上，已開發國家過去的紀錄不良。這項經費（與所需相比，仍然過低），來自於多邊或單邊的公私部門。發展中國家，也被期待能捐助某些經費。進一步來說，這項1000億美金有一個附帶的先決條件，即其他國家需有「有意義的碳排放減緩行動與政策透明度。」其實，為發展中國家所提供的氣候變遷經費，是已開發國家的法律與道德義務，特別在氣候變遷之適應這一點上，它是對已發生的損害之賠償。這項經費不應該附帶有任何附加的先決條件。

該項協定，將建立一個新的哥本哈根綠色氣候基金（Copenhagen Green Climate Fund），但協定並未提及此基金對〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉所需負責的程度，例如，這個新基金是否須在氣候變遷小組會議的授權下運作，並不清楚，這也是已開發國家與發展中國家間最大的爭議處。這項協定，也將設立一個高級研究小組（High Level Panel），以研究此基金的新經費來源。

在短期的經費上，協定指出，已開發國家將共同「處理」2010到2012年期間所需的300億美金。因此，實際上，這300億美金的來源尚未得到已開發國家的擔保，而這筆經費將是全新的經費，或是附加於某項計畫的經費，仍在未定之數。哥本哈根協定所清楚規定的，是這筆經費的部分，將來自於目前既有的國際財政制度，例如世界銀行。然而，世界銀行、全球環境設施（Global Environment Facility, GEF）以及其他類似的制度，因其在社會與環境議題上的紀錄不良，以及不民主的治理結構，而不斷招致許多發展中國家的嚴厲批判。

本次的氣候變遷協定包括了一些一般性用語，例如，對氣候變遷的影響之適應，以及停止伐木與保護森林在減排上的重要角色等。此協定將建立一個模糊的科學機制，以為了緩和與適應氣候變遷而提升技術的發展與轉移。哥本哈根協定也包括一個值得注意的用語，即利用市場的機會（opportunities to use markets）。協定對超過100個希望氣溫上升能夠低於攝氏5度的國家丟了個誘人的麵包屑，方法是，在整份文件的最後一句話中，協定提到，關於升溫低於5度的目標之可能性，將在未來討論。

哥本哈根協定的出現，及民主過程的邊緣化

讓哥本哈根協定出爐的過程，已經被精確地描述為世界貿易組織模式的超級溫室過程（super green room）。這是對此次會議幻滅的描述。因為，哥本哈根會談，是一個秘密的，同時也是排他性的會議。在會議過程中，主持國丹麥只在被選定的小部分國家間促成討論，而僅有這些國家能討論所謂的丹麥文件（Danish text）。哥本哈根協定的產出過程，明顯地不同於聯合國的正常會議，因為那些會議程序更具有開放性與包容性。

丹麥甚至在會議開始之前，就先設下了限制，而讓會議的排他性有了正當性基礎。在會議正式開始的數週前，他們召集了超過40位環境部長。後來流出的各樣丹麥文件，替該部長會議的首週與一半的會議過程留下了紀錄；丹麥不願意讓這些文件成為部長會議的會議成果。在氣候會談進行至一半的時後，40位來自某些國家的部長再次進行非正式的會談。儘管要在193個國家間，對氣候變遷此類複雜的議題達成共識，是一件困難的任務，但各國仍需在一個透明的、民主的程序中替他們自己決定某些事情，不論他們是希望在會議室中進行會議，還是他們選擇讓其他人代表他們決議。可以確定的是，絕不是讓丹麥自己決定這一切。

哥本哈根協定，其本身是卑劣的手段與拙劣的外交計謀的成果。在最後的全體大會中，大概是12月19日星期六凌晨三點，丹麥首相宣布〈哥本哈根氣候變遷協定〉已經通過。可是，大約四小時前，美國總統歐巴馬已經對世界宣布，協定已經完成，並且「文件中的絕大多數都已經達成協議。」然後，他就返回華盛頓以躲避大風雪。歐巴馬的宣示，發生在許多國家有機會檢視並討論該份協定之前。

在凌晨三點的宣布之後，玻利維亞大使發現，他們的代表從媒體得知協定通過，於是，該大使問道：「為什麼我們之前沒有討論這份文件？為什麼我們只有60分鐘閱讀這份決定我的人民的生活的文件？這份文件，不尊重我們過去兩年來的努力，我們的人民的權利，也不受尊重，所以，我們沒辦法在這份文件上背書，因為這份文件是由一小撮人所決定，他們以為他們能利用機會強迫我們接受。」

在一個讓人感到不齒的強力外交手段中，美國與英國嘗試撤回協定中對發展中國家的支援之基金，因為這些國家不接受該份協定。這種行為完全背離〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉的規定；規定已經指出，已開發國家有義務提供財政支援予開發中國家以處理該國的氣候變遷問題。

在此次會議的最後階段，也就是星期四或星期五的時候，丹麥秘密召集了26個國家舉行閉門會議。據信，哥本哈根協定，在那個時候，就已經被擬好了。美國總統歐巴馬以個人的身分，在該閉門會議中，與中國、印度、巴西和南非磋商一些用字遣詞的問題。

〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉的運作，是以簽約國彼此間的共識為基礎，但關於哪一方應對哥本哈根協定負擔什麼責任，在此次會議中，並未達成共識。因為產出協定的過程，並不民主，並且不符合聯合國官方會議的程序，這份協議因而造成大家的疑惑，並且在最後一天的大會中引發激烈的爭辯。要193個氣候變遷綱要公約締約國，在一份由26個國家秘密擬定的文件上背書，根本是不可能的事情，而且，這份文件，還是由歐巴馬單獨與中國、印度、巴西和南非針對用字遣詞進行討論後所擬定。最後，綱要公約締約國，僅同意對該份協定表達「了解」（take note）之意，而不是同意採納該協定。因此，哥本哈根氣候會談，既沒有接受，也沒有同意該協定。「了解」的意義為何，許多法律專家與決策者，仍在反覆推敲中，而哥本哈根氣候協定所留給我們的，就是一份法律立場模糊不清的政治文件。

哥本哈根協定是否且如何影響聯合國氣候綱要公約的正式談判，仍不清楚，對此，目前也仍有激烈的辯論。美國透過侵略性的手段，以僅可能地讓最多的國家與其共同推銷該協定。

對聯合國氣候變遷綱要公約及包容性多邊主義（Inclusive Multilateralism）的威脅

此一笨拙的哥本哈根峰會之危險結果，可能是將氣候變遷綱要公約的程序正義給邊緣化，即，每一個國家都應該有平等的發言權此項原則，讓位予一小撮特定團體的利益。於是，國際氣候談判的主要論壇，可能從此轉向八大工業國、20大工業國、主要經濟論壇（Major Economies Forum）或其他排除較不重要的國家之機制之手；這些較不重要的國家，是那些更為貧窮、更易受害，或不同意美國與其他強權的國家。這是一個相當嚴重的錯誤。如果一個國家，比方說，玻利維亞，一直要求已開發國家應以1990年為基準，減少其國內二氧化碳排放量至少49%，並且全球溫度上升不能超過攝氏1度，而這樣的國家，沒有權利與美國之類的國家在國際氣候變遷談判上平等對談，那麼，想達成一個正義的、有效的氣候變遷協定，將會非常困難。

因為部分發展中國家有能力阻止聯合國氣候變遷小組同意採納哥本哈根協定，另一部分的國家，也就是美國他的盟友，已經在為了共識程序的困難度嘆息了。然而，美國與其他富國，在過去，為了他們的利益，他們一直樂意同樣的共識程序繼續留在氣候變遷綱要公約之內，以共識為名，他們在氣候談判中阻止各國提出五花八門的議題。

一個對氣候變遷綱要公約的民主傳統之最大損傷，是歐巴馬當局利用並且操縱哥本哈根的談判過程，以在中美競爭關係中的熱門領域內，得到該國國會的掌聲，並維持其在國際事務上的排他主義。針對中美關係如何主導了該次會議，〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉執行秘書Yvo de Boer就評論：「美國要發展中國家做出可與其相比的承諾……隨著今春在美國參議院將進行的氣候變遷立法之辯論，美國的要求，對其自身來說，就是關鍵的了。」

為了修補美國與其他國家對〈哥本哈根氣候變遷協定〉所造成的損害，以及使〈聯合國氣候變遷框架公約〉復活，現在是關鍵時刻。只要各國對協定仍然沒有共識，隨著時間的流逝，解決氣候危機的代價也就愈高，而我們可能很快就會抵達無法逃避毀滅性影響的臨界點。

Analysis of the United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen
A Briefing for Policy Analysts with an Emphasis on the Role of the U.S. Government
January 21, 2010

In December 2009, 193 countries came together for two weeks in Copenhagen under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to “seal a comprehensive, ambitious and effective international climate change deal.” The Copenhagen Accord, the result that emerged from the Copenhagen process, falls utterly short of this goal.

As the countries which caused the climate crisis, the United States and other wealthy nations have a responsibility to lead the way in effectively and justly addressing climate change. Despite several years of work leading up to the start of the Copenhagen conference, there appeared to be little possibility of achieving an ambitious, effective outcome precisely because developed countries refused to operate in good faith, ignoring even the deadlines they set for themselves. Unfortunately, the U.S. did not surprise us. With the Copenhagen Accord, the United States and other wealthy countries failed to commit to deep greenhouse gas emissions reductions and to provide adequate funding for solutions in developing countries. Moreover, the process for striking the Accord was undemocratic, non-transparent, and peripheral to the official UN process. The Obama administration and the government of Denmark, as president of the Conference of Parties (COP) , seriously undercut the UNFCCC process while undermining environmental integrity, fairness, and justice.

International Climate Negotiations: A Two-Track Process
The UNFCCC, agreed to in 1992, is the framework agreement which governs intergovernmental actions to address climate change. The Kyoto Protocol is a specific agreement under the UNFCCC that implements the emissions reduction commitments of developed countries, along with other actions agreed by all countries to address climate change. While the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it is a party to the UNFCCC and is therefore bound to the Convention's obligations. Negotiations at the UNFCCC have taken place under two tracks: the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), which is a negotiating track to implement the Kyoto Protocol, and the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), which is a negotiating track under the Convention. These two tracks were designed to yield two outcomes in Copenhagen, which would be legally and substantively distinct.

The Kyoto Protocol specifically sets out how much Annex I - or developed countries – should reduce their emissions and through what mechanisms. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012. Over the last four years, the international community, through the AWGKP, has been negotiating the next commitment period for Annex I parties. Despite this, wealthy countries have proven unwilling to commit to any emissions reductions under this negotiating track, leading to incredible frustration throughout the negotiations.

In 2007, the international community agreed to the "Bali Action Plan," which led to a second, parallel track of AWG-LCA negotiations to enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC up to and beyond 2012. The AWG-LCA considers such issues as how to fund climate solutions in developing countries, technology cooperation, forest protection, adaptation to climate change impacts, and nationally appropriate actions developing countries can take to reduce emissions. Significantly, in an effort to bring the U.S. on board with global climate action, a specific section in the Bali Action Plan was carved out to ensure that the U.S. would make comparable emissions reductions under the LCA track as other wealthy countries committed to under the Kyoto Protocol.

For most of the two-week summit in Copenhagen, country negotiators - often staying late into the night trying to agree upon language - worked in these two tracks to iron out their differences over negotiating texts, which were intended to become the outcomes of the conference. However the negotiating process was often hampered by the significant and damaging procedural stumbles of the Danish COP Presidency. It was not until Friday, December 18, which was supposed to have been the final day of the conference (the conference finished a day late, on Saturday, December 19), that the Copenhagen Accord emerged.

The Accord was detached from the years-long, two-track negotiating process upon which UNFCCC discussions had focused until that point. Instead of honoring its responsibility to ensure fair and transparent negotiations through the two tracks among all countries, the Danish COP Presidency acted in deference to a select group of wealthy nations and ignored the concerns of others, especially many developing countries. Throughout the negotiations, actions by the Danish COP Presidency threatened the already fragile trust that is the foundation of a fair and effective deal.

Amid the confounding conclusion of the conference, little attention was paid to what these two negotiating tracks did accomplish: The mandate of the AWG-LCA, which could have expired in Copenhagen, was extended to the next Conference of Parties in 2010 in Mexico. The AWG-KP was also directed to deliver the results of its work at that time as well. Thus, negotiations under the two tracks will continue, and the question of how that work will intertwine with the Copenhagen Accord remains under debate.

What Was Needed from Copenhagen
A successful outcome from Copenhagen would have required a minimum of two commitments from developed countries: deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and adequate funds to address climate change in developing countries. The Copenhagen Accord didn’t deliver either.

Developing countries bear little responsibility for causing the climate crisis, but they will be hit hardest by its impacts. The UNFCCC has as one of its key tenets the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This principle recognizes the historical responsibility of developed countries for causing the climate crisis and the right of developing countries to sustainable development paths. Under the UNFCCC, the U.S. and other developed countries – as the world’s largest historical polluters – are legally obligated to make both deep emissions cuts at home and financial commitments to help developing countries transition to cleaner economies and address climate impacts.

An increasing number of scientists warn that carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere must be reduced to a relatively safe upper limit of 350 parts per million (ppm) in order to avoid potentially catastrophic outcomes. Reducing concentrations to this target requires deep and rapid cuts in emissions. However, according to a UNFCCC document which was leaked toward the end of the two-week Copenhagen session, the emission reduction proposals that countries have put on the table would instead increase atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to at least 550 ppm, and lead to global temperature increases of at least 3°C. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the world’s leading body of scientific, economic, and other experts addressing climate change), Africa is expected to warm at around 1.5 times the global average. Leaders from Africa made it clear in Copenhagen that a global temperature rise of even 2°C would be devastating for the peoples of their continent.

Estimates of the cost of addressing climate change in developing countries vary widely, but the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs concluded in its 2009 World Economic and Social Survey that developing countries would require about one percent of world gross domestic product – currently $500 to $600 billion annually - with most funding coming from the public sector, in a Marshall Plan type of program.

The Copenhagen Accord’s Contents
What is most notable about the two-and-a-half-page Copenhagen Accord is what it doesn’t do. It does not provide for any aggregate emission reduction target for developed countries after 2012 (when the current Kyoto Protocol commitment period ends). Individual countries may write in reduction targets, but there is nothing to bind them to these pledges. The absence of post-2012 developed country emission reduction commitments is arguably the biggest failure of the climate summit.

The Accord identifies a goal of staying below 2°C global temperature rise, but it lacks any system for determining whether countries’ individual pledges would come close to meeting that goal. A number of analyses have concluded that existing pledges are vastly insufficient to meet that target; for example, the leaked UNFCCC document estimated that with the reductions pledged thus far, the global temperature would likely rise at least 3°C.

The Accord does provide U.S. negotiators with the language they demanded regarding transparency and verification of actions taken by major developing country emitters to reduce emissions (i.e. mitigation). For domestic political reasons, the United States was particularly interested in securing this commitment from China. The most detailed paragraph of the Accord is on developing country mitigation actions and the measurement, reporting, and verification of those actions, which appear to be voluntary for Least Developing Countries and Small Island States but mandatory for other developing countries.

The Accord contains two blank appendices that are supposed to be filled in by countries which associate with the Accord by January 31, though that deadline now appears to be slipping. The first appendix is supposed to contain Annex I countries' quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020. The appendix provides a column for countries to record the base year against which emissions reductions will be measured. All Kyoto Protocol commitments have been based on a comparison to 1990 levels, but the United States and some other countries have been using a 2005 baseline. The second appendix is for Non-Annex I (developing) countries to list their nationally appropriate mitigation actions.

In terms of finance, the Copenhagen Accord sets a goal for developed countries to mobilize (U.S.)$100 billion annually by 2020. This non-binding goal provides no guarantee that this money will materialize (developed countries have a poor record when it comes to delivering pledged funds). The sum - magnitudes too low compared to the need - is to come from public and private sources that may be multilateral or bilateral. This means some proportion of the funding will be reliant on carbon markets. Developing countries may also be expected to contribute to the $100 billion. Further, the $100 billion comes with conditionalities – it is contingent on the pre-conditions of “meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation” of other countries. The provision of climate funding for developing countries is a legal and moral obligation of developed countries and, especially in the case of adaptation, it is compensation for damages done. It must not be linked to any pre-conditions.

The Accord would establish a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, but it says nothing about the new fund’s level of accountability to the UNFCCC (such as whether it will be under the authority of the COP), a formidable area of contention between developed and developing countries. The Accord would also create a “High Level Panel” to study new sources of revenue.

In terms of short-term finance, the Accord states that developed countries will jointly “approach” the provision of $30 billion for the 2010-2012 period. Thus, even the $30 billion is not guaranteed, and whether these funds will actually be new and additional is in question. The Accord makes it clear that some of these funds will flow through existing international financial
institutions like the World Bank. Many developing countries have heavily criticized the World Bank, Global Environment Facility (GEF), and other similar institutions for their poor social and environmental records and their undemocratic governance structures.

The text includes general language about adaptation to climate change impacts and the important role of stopping deforestation and forest degradation in reducing emissions. The Accord would establish a vague Technology Mechanism “to accelerate technology development and transfer” for mitigation and adaptation. There is also a noticeable mention of “opportunities to use markets.” The Accord throws a crumb to the more than 100 countries which have demanded a temperature rise of no more than 1.5°C, by including a reference, in the very last sentence of the text, to the possibility of discussing this target in the future.

Emergence of the Copenhagen Accord and the Sidelining of Democratic Process

The murky process through which the Copenhagen Accord emerged has been accurately described as a World Trade Organization-style “super green room” process3. This is an allusion to the secretive, exclusive process through which the Danish Presidency facilitated discussions among selected groups of countries, as well as a reference to the "Danish text" to which only those chosen countries had access. The Accord process stands in stark contrast to the normally open, inclusive proceedings at the UN.

The Danes laid the groundwork for exclusive meetings even before the start of the conference. They convened more than 40 environment ministers a few weeks prior to the start of the negotiations. Leaks of multiple Danish texts, which the Danes denied as potential draft outcomes
for the meeting, marked the first week and a half of the conference. On the Sunday in the middle of the negotiations, some 40 environment ministers again met for informal talks. While reaching consensus among 193 countries on such an enormously complex matter like climate change is indeed a very formidable task, countries must decide for themselves in a transparent, democratic manner whether they wish to be in the room for meetings or whether they choose to be represented by others. This was not something for the Danes themselves to decide.

The Copenhagen Accord itself resulted from underhanded tactics and botched diplomacy during the last two days of the conference. During the final plenary session of the COP, at about 3 in the morning on Saturday December 19, the Danish prime minister introduced the Accord for the very first time, as a done deal. Yet more than four hours earlier, President Obama had announced to the world that a deal had been struck and that “most of the text has been completely worked out.” He then left to go back to Washington to avoid a snow storm. Obama’s pronouncement occurred before many countries had even had a chance to see the text under discussion.

After the 3 a.m. announcement, the Bolivian ambassador, noting that the Bolivian delegation had learned about the Accord through the media, asked, “Why have we not discussed this document before and why are we given 60 minutes to look at this document now, which will decide the lives of our people… This document does not respect two years of work and our people’s rights are not respected, so we cannot endorse this document which is by a small group that think they can take the opportunity to impose on us.”

In a shameful demonstration of strong-arm diplomacy, the United States and the United Kingdom tried to withhold the Accord's climate funding from those developing countries that did not accept the Accord.4 This stands in stark contrast to the UNFCCC clauses that have already codified the provision of finance for developing countries as an obligation of developed
countries.

It is believed that the beginnings of the Copenhagen Accord emerged out of a secretive meeting of 26 countries convened by Denmark on the final Thursday or Friday of the conference. President Obama was personally involved in negotiating language with China, India, Brazil, and South Africa on Friday.

The UNFCCC operates on the basis of consensus among parties, but there was no consensus as to what the parties should do with the Accord. Because the process in which the Accord was struck was undemocratic and peripheral to the official UN process, the Accord was met with confusion and heated exchanges at the closing plenary. It would seem most unlikely that the 193- member UNFCCC body would simply endorse a document, as-is, that came out of a select 26- country meeting and from Obama’s discussions with China, India, Brazil and South Africa. In the end, parties to the UNFCCC agreed to merely “take note” of the Accord, rather than to adopt it. Thus, the conference neither accepted nor approved the Accord. The implications of “taking note” are still being hashed out by legal experts and policymakers, and the Copenhagen Accord remains a political document with ambiguous legal standing.

If and how the Copenhagen Accord will affect the formal negotiating process of the UNFCCC is unclear and currently under intense debate. The United States is working aggressively to get as many countries as possible to formally associate themselves with the Copenhagen Accord by a January 31, 2010 deadline.

A Threat to the UNFCCC and Inclusive Multilateralism

A dangerous consequence of the botched Copenhagen summit could be the sidelining of the inclusive UNFCCC process – where every country is supposed to have an equal voice – to make way for the primacy of more select groupings of countries. Thus, the main forum for international climate negotiations could shift to the G8, the G20, the Major Economies Forum, or some other venue that excludes representatives of seemingly less important or less desirable countries – be they poorer, more vulnerable, or in disagreement with countries like the United States. This would be a grave mistake. If a country like Bolivia – which has called for emissions reductions of at least 49 percent below 1990 levels domestically in developed countries by 2017 and less than 1°C global temperature rise – does not have the right to be on equal footing with a country like the United States in international climate negotiations, it is very hard to see how a just, effective climate agreement can be reached.

Because a small number of developing countries were able to stop the Copenhagen Accord from being adopted by the COP, a number of countries – the U.S. among them – have bemoaned the difficulties of remaining within a consensus process. However, the U.S. and other wealthy countries have been happy to use the same consensus process within the UNFCCC (and other international forums) to their advantage in the past to block advancement of various matters in negotiations.

To the great detriment of UNFCCC democratic tradition, the Obama administration used and manipulated the Copenhagen process to score points with Congress in the hot arena of U.S.-China competitive relations and to maintain U.S. exceptionalism in the international sphere. Yvo de Boer, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, recently commented on how U.S.-China relations dominated the conference and said that, “America wanted developing countries to make commitments that were comparable to those of the U.S. …With the debate about climate legislation in the Senate this spring, that was essential for America."

It is now critical to undo the damage done by the United States and others with the Copenhagen Accord and resuscitate the UNFCCC negotiations. With each month that goes by without a real agreement, the cost of solving the climate crisis gets higher – and we may soon pass tipping points that make avoiding catastrophic impacts impossible.

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2010年3月25日星期四